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Background
Piracy off the coast of Somalia, although has reduced significantly of late, has nonethe-
less drawn the attention of international community to a great extent. The piracy itself 
was a product of Somalia’s lack of capacity to govern itself and secure its coastal regions. 
The failure of the then incumbent Somali Government of General Siad Barre to con-
trol the growing discontentment among the thousands of Somalis led to internal unrest 
and consequently produced civil war that is yet to see any concrete solution. Interest-
ing to note in this development was the poaching by international shipping vessels off 
Somali coast that prompted to resorting to piracy by those Somalians whose livelihood 
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depended on fishing and who were deprived of it owing to the incapacity of the state to 
secure them the livelihood that they very much banked on.
An upshot from the above is the rise of piracy off the Somalia coast, which drastically 
affected all international commercial shipping that passed through the Gulf of Aden. It 
threatened international sea lanes of communication including that of China whose 
international trade with the outside world increased commensurate with its increasing 
economic activities. Reactions from the international community culminated in the 
form of constituting a multinational naval task force in 2008 to combating piracy. Inter-
estingly, China for the very first time sent its ships to take part along with the interna-
tional task force. Not only that, China also decided to re-open its closed embassy in 
Mogadishu after 23 years of break-up in diplomatic relations besides helping to enhance 
Somalia’s capacity to secure its borders1 including that of its long coast line that has 
largely been under the control of pirates. How and to what extent China’s maritime secu-
rity affected by the Somali piracy? What prompted China to play such role along with 
the international community? This article seeks to analyze the link between failed states 
and piracy and its implications for China’s maritime security.
The concept of piracy and maritime security
Piracy can be understood in different ways by different people as one that is conducted 
in international waters. However, a legal understanding is necessary that delineates 
clearly the very concept of it. According to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
law of the sea (UNCLOS) article 101, is defined as follows: 
a. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation committed for pri-
vate ends by the crew or the passengers of a private aircraft, and directed,
(i). On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property 
on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii). Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any state;
b. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft,
c. Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) 
or (b)”.
There is however a distinction between piracy and “Armed robbery against ships”. 
Armed robbery against ship is defined in the code of Practice for the investigation of 
crimes of piracy and Armed robbery against ship (UN resolution A. 922 (22) paragraph 
2.2) as follows:
Armed robbery against ships means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any 
act of depredation or threat thereof, other than an act of “Piracy”, directed against a 
1 See Rider (2015).
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ship or against person or property on board such ship, within a states jurisdiction 
over such offences2
Another useful definition on piracy is by Martin N. Murphy who in his book “small 
boats, weak states and dirty money” (2009), defines “piracy, very simply, is unlawful dep-
redation at sea involving the use or threat of violence possibly, but not necessarily, involv-
ing robbery… Piracy, while not a political crime, has invariably been linked to politics 
and the expression of state power, or more commonly weakness…” In the same vein, the 
International Maritime Bureau annual report 2009 defines piracy and armed robbery as:
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to com-
mit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in 
the furtherance of that act3
Although the definition of what constitutes piracy is clear, what is not clear is with 
regard to piracy committed within the territorial waters by countries that are considered 
failed states such as Somalia. Even the 1982 UN Convention on Law of Seas (UNCLOS) 
doesn’t spell out adequately such matters and hence the legality of the issue remains 
problematic.4
As for as security is concerned, in the traditional sense it is understood as security of 
the state from external military attack or as protecting the national interests or as a 
global security from nuclear catastrophe (UNDP 1994). However, since the events lead-
ing to 11 September 2001 a paradigm shift on the notion of security5 has taken place in 
the form of increase in a wide-array of threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, civil 
wars and not least maritime security—all of which are now viewed as non-traditional 
security threats. There is, according to Barry Buzan (quoted in Rahman 2009, p. 9) an 
economic dimension to security that can be applied at all levels of analysis. And in this 
economic dimension there is also a maritime element, which according to Barry (2009, 
p. 203) is equally important since the secure operation of global markets can be threat-
ened by external forces such as piracy and war. So what then is maritime security?
For obvious reasons, the term maritime security denotes threats that arise at the mari-
time domain. Bueger (2015, p. 2) in his evocative discussion on the subject categorizes 
the various arguments on maritime security as negative and positive–negative because 
threats such as inter-state disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, arms 
selling, illegal fishing etc., should be absent and positive because it means maintenance 
of “good” or “stable” order at sea. The other positive dimension that Christian Bueger 
mentions is the linkages between maritime security and economic growth. Of course, in 
conceptualizing this, questions such as whose economic growth and whose stable order 
do these definitions imply arise pointing to the lack of unanimity and prevalence of con-
fusion in understanding maritime security among scholars alike. Be that as it may, this 
research utilizes the economic growth approach since it includes “calls for more coordi-
nation, information sharing, regulation, law enforcement and capacity building”. As will 
2 See ICC (2010).
3 See ICC (2010).
4 See Somali Piracy Exposes Weakness in UN Law of the Sea (2015).
5 See for an excellent discussion on the concept of security, Buzan (2009), see also Rahman (2009).
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be discussed below, China has not only taken steps to coordinate and share information 
among international community on the issue but has also sought to engage Somalia by 
way of capacity building.
Methods
The issue of Somalian piracy questions how and to what extent the piracy had implica-
tions for maritime security of distant countries like China and consequently how China 
reacted to it. Hence, to the effect that this article focuses on the interface between piracy 
and its implications on China’s maritime security it employs qualitative methodology 
using descriptive and analytical approaches since a better understanding on the issues 
raised here could be done only by tracing the developments over time qualitatively. Not-
ing that qualitative study allows for investigation of a phenomenon through a variety of 
sources the tools for gathering data—primarily secondary in this case were diversified 
in order to generate sufficient data to help analyze the problem. Accordingly, data for 
the article were predominantly collected from relevant published literatures and other 
secondary sources including newspapers as well as the huge data base that exists in the 
form of e-resources. Besides, ideas and inputs from informal discussions with fellow col-
leagues during my service at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia helped frame the context 
of the article. The data collected were described and analyzed chronologically to help 
arrive at a conclusion.
Background: Somalia and its failed status
It is important at the outset to have a short glimpse at the failed status of Somalia and its 
repercussions. Located strategically on the red sea coast close to the Middle East and on 
the path way of most important shipping lanes in the east coast of Africa, North of the 
Equator between the Gulf of Aden on the North and Indian Ocean in the east, Somalia 
borders Djibouti on the Northwest, Ethiopia on the West, and Kenya on Southwest. It 
occupies a key position in the Horn of Africa between the Arab Peninsula and the Afri-
can continent. The Republic of Somaliland broke away from the mainland in 1991 but 
has not been able to gain international recognition except by few neighbouring states 
like Ethiopia. The semi-autonomous region Puntland became a self-governing entity in 
1998 but still considers itself part of Somalia and the remaining regions in the South and 
the centre is currently engulfed in factional and sectarian violence since 1991. Somalia’s 
population in 2012 was estimated at 10,195,000 and the country has an area of 637,657, 
square kilometres, its GDP in the same year was put at USD 1306.00.6 The Somalis had 
developed intense contact with the Persian and Arab immigrants at early stages which 
shaped their lifestyle, language and culture immensely (Elmi 2010).
Since attaining independence in July 1960, Somalia has been under political turmoil. 
The democratic political system that was put in place after independence was short lived. 
Primarily due to financial and administrative incapacity, successive civilian governments 
was not able to pull along and in October 1969 Somalia witnessed a bloodless coup 
which brought Major General Siad Barre to power turning the country into a socialist 
state in which all able bodied citizens were compelled to undergo military training. He 
6 See UN Data Somalia (2015).
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ruled the country as a despot until his overthrow in 1991. Obviously, Barre’s totalitarian 
rule provided the necessary incentive for his own downfall. His centralized administra-
tion manifested by militarizing the state without any opposition; the abrogation of the 
national constitution; dissolution of the elected National Assembly and appointment of 
people to important positions of power based on their affiliation and loyalty than merit; 
and bringing Somalia under a socialist ideology in tune with the then Soviet Union—all 
of them and many more put a full stop to his rule (Lewis 2003).
With the mismanagement of Somalia’s political terrain by Siad Barre’s regime, war-
lords emerged along clan lines carving out enclaves and becoming very influential by 
smuggling just anything. In spite of Somalis being a homogenous people, unlike most 
other African societies, with common religion, “clanism” has what has questioned the 
homogeneity. Somalis are organized along clan lineages and hence traditionally, conflicts 
are solved by local clan elders. Hence all attempt by the international community to put 
an end to the crisis in Somalia failed. Notable among them were the initiative by the sub-
regional organization Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other 
individual member countries of the Horn of Africa such as the Arta conference organ-
ized by Djibouti in 2000 that brought in the existence of Transitional National Assembly 
under Abdul Qasim as Interim President for 2 years and later the Eldoret peace initiative 
at Kenya in August 2003 that created another transitional government but this time with 
a new and significant addition of Federalism and which was called as “Transitional Fed-
eral Government” under the Presidentship of Abdullahi Yousuf Ahmed. Although the 
federal concept would provide the necessary glue to all war lords to chip-in, yet, it failed 
as it was perceived to be orchestrated by neighbouring Ethiopia, which happens to be its 
arch-enemy.7 Besides, each warlord desired to retain their power and if at all they lose, 
they do so only with their death and at that point of time, their descendants belonging to 
their own clan would take over power. Any sharing or disbursement of power to other 
clans or tribes would not be welcomed by the war lord.
By 2006, in view of lack of any agreement from among the different clans on the man-
ner in which Somalia should be governed extremist Islamists such as Al-Shabaab with 
claims to Somalia’s political power and very egregiously inflamed the conflict. In the 
process Somalia turned into war zone leading to increased poverty, unemployment and 
migration to neighboring countries like Ethiopia and more importantly turning to piracy.
Addressing this issue, Fukuyama (2004) argues that “weak or failed states are close to 
the root of many of the world’s most serious problems” and these range from poverty 
and various diseases to drug trafficking and terrorism, whose occurrence in one part of 
the world have a direct or indirect consequences on the rest of the world. It is obvious 
therefore that the strength or weakness of a state is a matter of international significance 
7 President Abdullahi has been portrayed as a supporter of Ethiopia and it dates back to the 1977 Ogaden war in which 
Somalia fought Ethiopia over the issue of sovereignty over Ogaden region and lost the war. Ogaden region is now under 
the control of Ethiopia and is supposed to be a fertile region in the whole of Ethiopia and claimed by the Union of 
Islamic Courts (UIC) of Somalia even now. President Siad Barre blamed his military generals for his defeat at the hands 
of Ethiopia and even went to the extent of putting several of his generals to death. Colonel Abdullahi was one of those 
prominent military officers who escaped to neighboring Kenya and later took refuge in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia where he 
started an opposition party for the first time against Siad Barre rule. The fact that Siad Barre had an opposition based in 
Ethiopia was enough for the Somalis to believe that it has been aided and abetted by Ethiopia. And the fact is that, the 
present Ethiopian government of EPRDF has extended its support to Abdullahi and was even instrumental in the instal-
lation of Abdullahi as leader of the Transitional Federal Government.
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and no more it can be taken lightly. However, it matters a lot whether a state has the 
capacity to command loyalty, maintain essential elements of sovereignty, a monopoly 
over the legitimate use of force and the ability to garner enough resources that are neces-
sary to rule (Holsti 1996). Hence, various interconnected components go to determine 
the strength or weakness of a state and they are the idea of the state itself, the physical 
basis, and the government machinery. Where these elements are well connected, their 
prospect to sustain and support each other will be strong. And if not, then we may term 
it as “failed states”—political entities that have collapsed or are on the verge of collapse. 
This is a state of affairs where there is no public order, ineffective command of authority 
and loyalty and groups of all sorts and factions attempt to resist those who might try to 
integrate the community to establish effective order.
Rationale for Somali piracy and its method of operation
The piracy in Somalia revolves around the Somali territorial waters, the Gulf of Aden 
and the Indian Ocean (Fig. 1). It has the longest coastline of about 3025 km in continen-
tal Africa. However the Puntland region of Somalia constitutes the critical axis of the 
Somali piracy as over 90 % of the Somalians involved in piracy are from Puntland. Land 
bases of the pirates are also found in the Puntland communities from where they launch 
out to sea. Besides Puntland, the other region from where piracy network was operating 
was the Mudug region in the Southern part of Somalia.8
Tracing the origins, Murphy (2009) indicates that much of Somali piracy appears to 
have its roots in fishing disputes.9 The absence of any effective authority operating along 
Africa’s long national coastline has meant that fishing vessels from Europe and East Asia 
could exploit the area’s rich marine resources at the expense of locals causing dangerous 
tensions. In other words, the Somali fishermen became increasingly challenged by well 
organized and sophisticated international fishing vessels from Europe and elsewhere 
(Fig.2). The Somali fishermen could not simply stand this competition from interna-
tional fishing firms and hence they simply turned to piracy. This argument falls within 
the mainstream of most stories tracing the origins of Somali piracy but though not 
exhaustive as many other strands have since emerged. Some commentators argue that 
the main sources of piracy in the region is armed groups, formed by local fishermen in 
response to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) by foreign fishing vessels, 
which subsequently become pirate gangs.10 For example, a July 2005 report from the 
United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) estimated that 
Somalis lost $100 million to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in the country’s exclusive 
economic zone in 2003–2004.11 What is noteworthy in this argument is the economic 
dimension to security, which the ordinary Somali men faced that later translated into 
maritime element in the form of pirate attacks in order to protect their own livelihood.12 
8 See United Nations Security Council (2015).
9 For a good account on the origins of Somali piracy see Osei-Tutu (2011).
10 See Ploch et al. (2010); see also Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (2009). See Fig. 1 which shows a 
picture of European trawlers off the coast of Somalia.
11 See Marine Resources Assessment Group (MRAG) (2005).
12 Of the 439 word wide pirate attacks more than half of them were attributed to Somali piracy. See for example Alessi 
and Hanson (2014).
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As will be seen below, for China (and the rest of the world) it is the same economic secu-
rity that has forced them to cooperate against the Somali pirates.
The pirates operate in a gang of four to six people and are organized along networks 
(Gilpin 2007, p. 7). Their method of operation appears to be haphazardly executed while 
on shore their tactic of hijacking vessels and holding them, along with crew and cargo, to 
ransom is relatively sophisticated (Murphy 2009, p. 38). The lawless conditions in Soma-
lia and one may add with the cooperation of fragile government authorities especially in 
Puntland, where it is possible to move a ship beyond the reach of rescue or retaliation, 
make it an ideal place for ransom based piracy to thrive. The ransom income of Somali 
pirates has probably been substantial. For example, the most successful group in the 
Southern Mudug region called the Xarardheere based ‘Somali Marines’, apparently 
demanded $1 m and eventually settled for #8000,000 for the return of the Dongwon-ho, 
a South Korean tuna fishing vessel that was captured in April 2006.13
13 It is estimated that in 2011 alone Somali piracy impact on global economy cost $7 billion (Ploch et al. 2010).
Fig. 1 Map of Somalia and adjoining territories
Fig. 2 European Trawler in Gulf of Aden
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With the increasing success of such attacks and hijacking of sea vessels and the huge 
financial returns in the form of ransoms, the fortunes of these ex-fishermen changed 
and this resulted not only in a kind of organization or network for these earliest pirates 
but their success attracted many more Somalians, including, teachers, businessmen, 
militants working for several warlords, accountants and many more Somalians in other 
fields of human endeavor including Somali Diaspora (The Daily Monitor, 23rd Novem-
ber 2008, p. 20).
China’s role and implications for China’s maritime security
China, although a distant country, yet was affected severely by the piracy. A pointer in 
this case is the capture in November 2008 of two Chinese commercial ships by Soma-
lian pirates and many Chinese taken as hostage. Not only that the fear of many more 
being captured and disrupting Chinese commercial traffic and sea lanes of communi-
cation loomed large prompting China to take steps to counter it. Noteworthy among 
the several steps taken by China since then, is to enhance Somalia’s capacity. For China, 
Somalia’s capacity building hence, is closely inter-twined with that of the security at the 
sea—for both the Somalians and China. Whereas the West sees Somalia and the prob-
lem of piracy as one associated with its failed status and the consequent threat posed by 
terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab, China’s approach is markedly different in that it has 
sought to engage with Somalia a la other African countries by building its capacity in 
order that piracy can no more thrive and thereby provide a stepping stone to strengthen 
its relationship with Somalia. A couple of issues comes out of this development (1) Chi-
nese maritime economic interests cannot be compromised and (2) China is taking a 
more assertive role in international affairs without compromising its foreign policy prin-
ciple of non-interference in internal affairs (Andrew and Strange 2013, p. 3).
Accordingly, China has played a constructive role with regard to the piracy issue by 
way of (1) cooperating with the multinational task force to combating piracy and (2) 
simultaneously taking steps to adopt a comprehensive approach to maritime security. 
China’s participation14 was a response to the piracy threat as per the UN Security Coun-
cil resolution 1851 of 2008, which authorizes states to cooperate to counter piracy. 
Besides, it was with the sovereign consent of the Somali Transitional Federal govern-
ment that China had sent its naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden. The state run China 
Daily reported that the “Chinese government supports the international community’s 
decision to cooperate on the piracy problem according to international law and UN 
Security Council resolutions”.15 And since its first offshore operation in 2008, China has 
sent about 16 naval task forces of not less than three ships in each force and has escorted 
several thousand ships both domestic and foreign. According to State media, the Chi-
nese task forces consisted of “most advanced frigates, destroyers and amphibious ships 
and have escorted 5463 Chinese and foreign commercial ships, thwarted more than 30 
potential pirate attacks, rescued over 40 commercial ships, and escorted 11 vessels pre-
viously taken by pirates”.16
14 See Chinese Naval Fleet Carries out First Escort Mission Off Somalia (2015).
15 See Navy Ships May Head to Somalia (2015).
16 See Andrew and Strange (2013).
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This shows not only China’s cooperative role with the international community but also 
reflects its “key goal to register the presence of Chinese navy”17 and thereby to “demon-
strate its desire to get maximum domestic and international publicity from the mis-
sions”.18 As rightly noted by Kamerling Susanne (2011, p. 121) the Indian Ocean offers 
more opportunities for maritime newcomers such as China than do other Oceans. With 
the exception of India, the other littoral states of Indian Ocean are small powers but with 
a large population and with about 40  % of the world coastline (Amit et  al. 2011, p. 1). 
Hence the region has become important not only for countries to protect their respective 
interests but also to show case their international role and status. Important to note here 
is that China has been conducting naval drills to show case its power. According to Teshu 
Singh,19 the several naval drills conducted by China close to the GOA are meant to “dem-
onstrate the growing reach of the country’s maritime reach and power”.
That apart, one can also note China’s comprehensive approach to solve the problem. 
This was emphasized by the Somali Ambassador to the African Union at Beijing request-
ing China to find permanent solution to the problem by way of building Somali capacity 
to tackle the problem in the long run.20 Along this line, the Chinese Ambassador Huang 
Jemin called for a comprehensive approach to address the problem by “boosting the 
security capacity in Somalia, assisting economic development there and strengthening 
the capacity of other nations on that part of the Indian Ocean coast”.21 In fact, during the 
decade spanning the cold war years between 1963 and 1971, Somalia received $ 130 mil-
lion in credits but with its collapse in 1991 the aid ended.22 However, China’s aid to 
Somalia has resumed now. In fact, to these many countries in Africa, China has always 
been a welcoming phenomenon notable examples being Somalia’s immediate neigh-
bours in the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia, the Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti.
Besides, one should note that China’s economic interests outside its region have grown 
tremendously leading to transformation in security priorities. From being a coastal 
defence force, Chinese Navy has now expanded its role to that of far seas. It has invested 
heavily in the development of ports in order to ensure reliable access to Chinese com-
mercial shipping that uses the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.23 This is largely 
owing to its expansion of bilateral economic ties with countries in Africa and Europe. Of 
worthy to note is the fact that China is now Africa’s largest trading partner. Apart from 
its energy dependence24 China relies on large scale infrastructural projects for its state 
owned enterprises in addition to seeking sustained markets for exports particularly from 
Africa. The author is a witness to the huge infrastructural projects China has taken in 
Ethiopia and also in Kenya. All of these can be possible only when the transportation 
route is safe and sound.
17 See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-12/17/content_7311735.htm.
18 See Andrew and Strange (2013).
19 See Teshu (1997).
20 See Zhang (2015).
21 See Weihua (2016).
22 See Shinn (2011).
23 See Scott (2014).
24 It is estimated that by 2030 its dependence on oil import through seas will increase to about 80 % and hence maritime 
transport needs to be protected. See Andrew and Strange (2013), p. 13.
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Hence China feels compelled to attach importance to maritime security as most of 
its economic needs are met through the Oceans. Also, there is constant expansion of 
infrastructural projects in the Indian Ocean region in which new ports, rail systems 
and sea-based pipelines traverse across the Ocean to connect parts of West Asia for 
economic and trade purposes. New proposals have also been put forward to this 
effect highlighting the emphasis that this region has attained of late. For example, 
the recent proposals to set up a $ 40 billion fund to support the Maritime Silk Road 
initiative by China along with developing a new Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank and a New Development Bank in which billions more would be contributed by 
China adds testimony to this.25 Hence, for China, securing and protecting the sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs) becomes all the more vital. It is obvious therefore 
that there is an increased deployment of naval power both by the littoral and extra-
regional powers to “support their respective26 national strategic and economic 
interests”.27
In fact, China’s Defence White Paper pubished in 2013 stresses that it will “protect 
national maritime rights and interests and national security interests in outer space and 
cyber space” and armed forces providing reliable support for China’s interests overseas.28 
This is also indicative of the shift in China’s naval objectives from one of coastal defence 
to offshore defence and ultimately to far seas. A further testimony to this is the speech by 
the former Chinese President Hu Jintao at the 18th National CCP Congress in which he 
stressed that “We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace 
security”.29 Notably, he emphasized the need to protect China’s maritime interests saying:
We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, develop the marine 
economy, protect the marine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard China’s 
maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power.
The above is telling of the significance attached to maritime security by China. Notable 
with regard to the emphasis on far sea operations and preparedness is that it is not spe-
cific to any particular region or space; rather it is defined by Chinese maritime interest 
which, as noted above, has been expanding of late. In fact, China has been increasing its 
access to ports and airfields and making huge investments in infrastructure development 
and also attempting to establish base facilities with friendly countries like Sri Lanka as 
part of it Maritime Silk Route initiative. Therefore it is clear that China is embarking on 
expanding its influence commensurate with its expanding role and interests.
Implications
China’s expanding role and interests has brought with it certain implications as well. Its 
increasing assertiveness beyond East Asia became noticed when it decided to send its 
naval forces to participate in counter piracy operations. This shows the balancing role of 
25 See Chang (2014).
26 Italics mine.
27 See Sakhuja (2014).
28 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2013-04/16/content_4442752.htm. Accessed 5th May 2015.
29 See full text of the 18th National CCP Congress (2012).
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China commensurate with its rising status in the international community. This new 
venture was one of cooperative as compared to that of East and South China Sea corri-
dors, which was one of forcefulness. Whatever the differences might be, the implications 
that one can draw from this is the extending economic and military influence that China 
is able to portray now. It is along this line that the much talked about Maritime Silk Road 
(MSR) Corridor project was proposed and which aims to enhance trade and sea connec-
tivity and assist in the development of local economies. The MSR project “envisions an 
economic cooperation area stretching from the Western Pacific to the Baltic Sea as a 
sort of maritime highway buttressed by Chinese-supported infrastructure and port facil-
ities in states straddling maritime routes along which China’s trade and natural resources 
flow” (Singh 2014, p. 133). In fact, the project crosses the northern Indian Ocean to Nai-
robi, Kenya and goes north around the Horn of Africa and moving through the Red Sea 
into the Mediterranean, with a stop in Athens before meeting the land-based Silk Road 
in Venice. The Silk Road concept aims to “connect more than 50 countries via the sea 
and build a network of port cities along the Silk Road”.30 The port facility that China has 
developed in Pakistan in Gwadar connecting Beijing with Gulf Countries and Arabian 
Sea enables China to transport oil through this facility and into China via land.31
Therefore, a foot hold in the Horn by way of re-opening of its embassy at Mogadishu 
in order to deal with the Somali piracy testifies China’s future ambitions and desire. In 
this regard it is noteworthy to mention a report by the South China Morning post that 
China is expected to set up a network of offshore military supplies depot in strategic 
ports such as in Djibouti to protect its national interests. In fact, Agence France-Presse 
quoting the Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh reported that talks were ongoing to 
enlist Beijing’s military base in the country.32 Quoting a naval expert at the Chinese 
Naval Research Institute, the South China Morning Post said that it is inevitable that 
more overseas supply ports will be set up in Africa and other strategic areas as Chinese 
national interests expand.33 Understandably military bases in that part of the world 
would only go to support China’s offshore commerce but it would also raise concerns on 
the part of extra-regional players particularly the USA which has been holding Djibouti 
base as part of its war on terror. Concerns are also there on the part of regional players 
such as India as to the real intentions of China which are viewed sceptical.
Conclusions
To conclude it is clear that China’s participation in the counter piracy operations is 
owing to the impact it had on its maritime economic security and consequently its 
desire to extend its influence well beyond its sphere of influence. The 5 year long opera-
tion consolidated the Chinese navy as an Ocean going navy and an avenue to improve its 
ability to operate beyond its sphere of influence. The participation further enabled China 
to solidify its logistical support, coordinate with other countries, acted as an avenue 
30 See Narayan (2015).
31 See for details, Saibal (2015).
32 See Agence France Presse (2015).
33 See http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1794667/china-sets-sights-offshore-military-depots-
analysts.
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to improve its confidence and finally make a mark among regional and extra-regional 
powers that it is a responsible player in the world and cannot be ignored in any non-
traditional security issue affecting the international community. It also contributed to 
more close ties with Somalia and a foot hold in that part of the world with possibilities of 
establishing a military base in the near future. As was pointed out talks are already under 
way to establish such bases in Djibouti along with US base and the initiative for a mari-
time security road also envisages precisely this. While its positive contributions in such 
forms are welcome, time has come for major players including US and India to come 
to terms with China owing to its rising status. In other words, the intense responses 
from China to Somali piracy should not only be seen from the point of view of indi-
vidual countries interest alone but also the need for cooperative and a responsible role 
that the international community should take while responding to such common issues 
and addressing them in a common platform. Cooperation is inevitable on major issues 
of common concern such as the climate change negotiations, Doha Trade round of talks, 
restructuring of global economic institutions like IMF, balancing USA supremacy etc., 
and more importantly that which was rightly exhibited by China in the case of Somali 
piracy. Be that as it may, time has come to accept China’s role commensurate with its big 
power status. What remains to be seen is China’s continued constructive role that takes 
on world leadership in a benign and constructive manner.
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